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'terred by having to investigate which States had enacted relevant 1tion and its practical effects, thereby undermining one of the primary >ses of the legislation, which is to attract international arbitration to alia. The deletion of section 29 ensures that a single Australian monwealth) law will govern all international commercial arbitrations 1cted in Australia, unless the parties themselves choose otherwise.
The Editors tionary Lessons from American Securities Arbitration: Litigation v. Arbitration ~United States, it is now quite common for lawyers and others to bemoan is often referred to as 'the litigation crisis. ' 1 No less an authority than 'r Chief Justice Warren Burger has long complained that American courts become overburdened' by too may 1awsuits.
2
Echoing other 1entators, Burger recommends arbitration as 'a better way to do it. ' 3 Just 'carpenter's handsaw as replaced by the power saw, ' 4 so is arbitration the rn power tool to replace litigation in court. Similarly, the Report of the gious American Bar Association's Commission on Professionalism 1m ends expanded use of arbitration in lieu of a norrnal trial before a judge ty jury-' ere should be no rush to judgment favouring arbitration. In the first place, ot at all clear that there is a litigation crisis in the United States. Criticism so-called litigation explosion is based more on anecdotal evidence than tl empirical studies. The empirical studies that do exist show that the ion rate in the United States during the 1970's, for example, is only about f what it was during the nineteenth century. 6 American courts may appear led to the average observer, but we should realise that there are fewer 
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The broker-dealer insists on arbitration, while the customer refuses, because both know that securities arbitration favours the broker-dealer. In a securities arbitration, often the chairperson is another stock-broker. We should not be surprised if a broker-dealer is not the most detached, neutral observer to judge his fellow broker-dealer.
14 ' The broker-dealer who is the arbitrator in one case may well be the respondent in the next case. The so-called independent arbitrators on the securities arbitration panel often are practicing lawyers who represent other broker-dealers and have a similar mind-set. 15 It is not surprising that the defendant seeks compulsory arbitration because the defendant/brokers view that as being in their best interest.
Following the Supreme Court decision in McMahon, the securities regulators of various states have tried, by state regulation, to limit the power of brokers to insist that customers agree to arbitrate any disputes growing out of the purchase or sale of stocks, bonds, and other securities. The director of consumer education for the North American Securities Administrators Association has said that there is a laundry list of reasons behind this eflort to forbid mandatory arbitration. The most obvious complaints -'The [arbitration] panels are stacked in favour of the industry, the proceedings are not public and there are no written decisions.' 16 American arbitration decisions arc also quite difficult to overturn on appeal, even when one of the arbitrators had a conflict of interest that would have required disqualification of a federal judgeY Fortunately, federal courts have mitigated the harshness of that rule by according securities arbitration limited res judicata and collateral estoppel effects. The tilt in the scales of justice in favour of defendants in cases of securities arbitration may be illustrated by the simple fact that broker-dealers, when they are plaintiffs, prefer to file suit in federal court rather than proceed with arbitration. When the securities dealers and brokers are defendants, their perspective changes and they insist on arbitration of custo:r:ller complaints, as in McMahon. In the year following the October, 1987 stock market crash, when the number of claims for arbitration increased over 329%, n1any brokers and securities firms found themselves as plaintiffs trying to collect margin money from their customers. Some disgruntled brokers were forced to arbitrate. Brokers accounted for 20% of the arbitration cases filed during the first three months of 1988. In contrast, during all of 1987, brokers were plaintiffs in arbitration cases only 9% of the time. Yet, such figures on the use of arbitration by brokers are misleading. When brokers became plaintiffs, many preferred to file lawsuits in federal court, not arbitration claims before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), because courts offer much more protection. Such brokers made no effort to inform their customers that they could insist on compulsory arbitration in light of the McMahon decision. J'l The move to encourage arbitration is not lilnited to disputes involving federal securities laws. In an effort to reduce expensive litigation, some courts now require the parties to engage in so-called 'mandatory' arbitration, followed by a full trial if either party objects to the arbitration award. At this trial, evidence of the arbitration and the results are inadmissible. 20 The hope, apparently, is that this pre-litigation hurdle will encourage settlement. Although these efforts are well-intentioned, they may well result in more expense, not less, and increased delay, not expedition. This new procedure requires the parties to cross an extra hurdle before they reach trial, when the jury verdict really is mandatory and not advisory.
Warren Burger, while Cbiefjustice, praised those law schools that now offer courses in arbitration, alternative dispute resolution and negotiation, and blamed some of the 'litigation explosion' on those law schools who have not placed sufficient emphasis on the advantages of arbitration. frankly, unsophisticated. When Americans turn to the courts, it is usually not because lawyers, bred to be litigious in American law schools, urge their clients to make mountains out of molehills; on the contrary, en1pirical studies show that lawyers are not typically the ones pushing their clients to litigate. In the paradigm case the lawyers for both sides urge settlement; it is the clients who want to litigate and reject efforts to compromise.
22
To learn of alternative remedies in law school is, of course, useful, but let us not be naive. Teaching future lawyers about negotiation, settlement and arbitration will not make them less litigious. We law professors simply do not have that much power to change human nature. A recent study of German legal ethics illustrates this simple fact of life. On the surface, German training of lawyers appeared to promote a systern much less litigious than our own. Yet appearances were deceiving. When one looked below the surface, the study demonstrated that the German legal system was just as litigious as the Arnerican system. Germany, like the United States, turns out an enormous number of lawyers each year (though the numbers may be deceiving because Germany, unlike the United States, distinguishes between advocacy and advice). German law heavily regulates fees in an effort to encourage settlement, but, in practice, such regulation has increased lawyer fees and has delayed settlement, because the German lawyers often postpone settlement until the eleventh hour in order to increase their regulated fees. Lawyers in Germany, like lawyers in this country, commonly believe that their legal opponents engage in frivolous motions and frivolous appeals, and in delaying actions. 23 ' Professional Duties, 48 Rables Zeithschrift245, 281, 284(1984) .
to Europe, but when we look more closely, we see ourselves in a mirror. 24 Those in the United States who see compulsory arbitration as an elixir for a perceived litigation crisis, should consider the problems carefully before they drink too deeply. Like the American Indians who thought that they were selling the new settlers concurrent hunting rights, but were later startled to learn that they had sold title in fee simple absolute, those who wish to trade· in judicial protections for arbitration may soon learn that they have made a similar bargain.
Professor Ronald D. Rotunda 24 Professor Luban 's study concludes: 'German legal ethics is adversarial ethics.' Luban, supra at 280. See also id. at 207 ('Ultimately, the lesson may be that no system of procedural justice with a private bar can evade the paradox that underlies adversarial ethics -the paradox deriving from the fact that the system of justice creates its own antagonists.') (footnote omitted).
